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I. INTRODUCTION 
In a time of rapid and extreme healthcare change following the 
passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA),1 
the need to have a certain process and application governing 
                                                          
 
 1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010). 
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healthcare mergers is of the utmost importance.2 The ACA has 
imposed significant changes on consumers as well as healthcare 
providers.3 Many providers and hospitals have started 
consolidating their entities to comply with the ACA, streamline 
care, and maintain profitability.4 In light of this increase in 
healthcare mergers, antitrust laws governing healthcare mergers 
should be reexamined and updated to reflect the current 
healthcare economy, as well as Congress’ objective in passing such 
legislation.5 
Mergers, specifically healthcare mergers, can potentially 
violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act if the merger has future 
anticompetitive effects.6 A merger may be enjoined under the 
Clayton Act if the potential for anticompetitive effects is alleged, 
even if actual anticompetitive facts are not proven.7 First, the 
entity challenging the merger must show a prima facie Clayton Act 
violation.8 The entity defending the merger then has to show that 
                                                          
 2. Brief for Professors & Scholars of Law & Econ. & Int’l Center of Law & Econ. et. 
al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 4–5, Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. 
St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2015) (Nos. 1:12-cv-00560- BLW, 1:13-cv-
00116-BLW) [hereinafter Brief for Professors]. 
 3. Melinda K. Abrams et al., The Affordable Care Act’s Payment and Delivery 
System Reforms: A Progress Report at Five Years, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (May 7, 2015), 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2015/may/aca-payment-and-
delivery-system-reforms-at-5-years.   
 4. Leemore Dafny, Hospital Industry Consolidation — Still More to Come?, 370 N. 
ENGL. J. MED. 198, 198–99 (2014).  
 5. See Brief for Professors, supra note 2, at 3–6. 
 6. David L. Glazer, Clayton Act Scrutiny of Nonprofit Hospital Mergers: The Wrong 
Rx for Ailing Institutions, 66 WASH. L. REV. 1041, 1042 (1991) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012)). 
 7. Id.  
 8. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd. (St. Lukes), 
778 F.3d 775, 788 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Section 7 does not require proof that a merger or other 
acquisition has caused higher prices in the affected market. All that is necessary is that the 
merger create an appreciable danger of such consequences in the future.” (quoting Hosp. Corp. 
of Am. v. F.T.C., 807 F.2d 1381, 1389 (7th Cir.1986))). 
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the merger is not anticompetitive, despite the prima facie 
showing.9 One way of doing this is to show merger-based 
efficiencies.10 
The efficiencies defense consists of both cost efficiencies, and 
quality based efficiencies.11 Cost efficiencies look at the financial 
savings that will result from combining entities, while quality 
based efficiencies focus on the efficiencies that improve the quality 
of the merged entity’s product or performance.12 The efficiencies-
based defense is being applied inconsistently among the courts, 
leading to inconsistent and unpredictable outcomes in healthcare 
mergers relying on the efficiencies defense.13 Quality based 
efficiencies are often not given significant, if any, weight in merger 
analysis, which essentially disregards potential consumer benefits 
resulting from mergers generating quality efficiencies.14 
The inconsistent application of the efficiencies defense in 
healthcare mergers between circuit courts, as well as the lack of 
certainty from the Supreme Court, leaves healthcare entities with 
uncertainty regarding the success or failure of mergers.15 This 
results in increased litigation, and a disruption in patient care.16 
Some circuits, such as the D.C., Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh, have 
recognized the efficiencies defense as a viable method of defeating 
an alleged Section 7 Clayton Act violation.17 
                                                          
 9. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). 
 10. Id.  
 11. Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, Quality-Enhancing Merger Efficiencies, 100 
IOWA L. REV. 1969, 1975 (2015). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 1993. 
 14. Brief for Professors, supra note 2, at 4. 
 15. Id. at 8. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See ProMedica Health Sys., Inc. v. F.T.C., 749 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2014); F.T.C. v. 
H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 720–22 (D.C. Cir. 2001); F.T.C. v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 
F.3d 1045, 1047 (8th Cir. 1999); F.T.C. v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1991). 
Each of these circuits has recognized that the efficiencies defense is a defense that can be used 
successfully in rebutting a prima facie showing under the Clayton Act. 
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However, other circuits, like the Ninth Circuit in Saint 
Alphonsus Medical Center-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health System, 
Ltd. (St. Luke’s), have not clearly recognized the viability of 
efficiencies defenses in healthcare mergers, leaving healthcare 
entities who would rely on the defense in limbo as to whether or 
not a merger will be successful.18 Additionally, the circuits give 
uncertain and disproportional weight to cost based efficiencies and 
often ignore or provide unpredictable weight to quality based 
efficiencies.19 
This article advocates that developing a certain and consistent 
application of the efficiencies defense in healthcare mergers will 
decrease litigation by providing a framework for healthcare 
entities seeking to merge. Additionally, this article advocates that 
giving increased weight to quality based efficiencies and ACA 
compliance is the best way to achieve this consistency. Finally, this 
article advocates that recognizing quality based efficiencies, and 
giving them greater weight in a Section 7 Clayton Act merger 
analysis, will bring antitrust law into accord with current 
healthcare policy. Recognizing quality based efficiencies will also 
improve the quality of healthcare delivery by acknowledging the 
benefit to consumers that results from the streamlined, integrated 
care that is achieved through healthcare mergers. 
First, this article will seek to educate the reader on how the 
ACA has changed healthcare delivery systems.20 This will examine 
the goals of the ACA, as well as how the ACA has changed the 
healthcare market for consumers and providers. This article will 
then look at Section 7 of the Clayton Act,21 focusing specifically on 
                                                          
 18. St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d 775, 789 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 19. Id. at 788; ProMedica Health Sys., 749 F.3d at 559; H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d at 
720; Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d at 1047; Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d at 1206. 
 20. See infra Part II.  
 21. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). 
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how the efficiencies defense can be used to rebut a prima facie 
showing of a Section 7 violation.22 
Next, this article looks at the difference between cost based 
and quality efficiencies, and how this distinction, as well as the 
efficiencies defense in general, are being applied inconsistently in 
merger cases in the courts.23 Then this article will discuss the St. 
Luke’s case and how the Ninth Circuit’s decision in St. Luke’s leads 
to greater inconsistency regarding the efficiencies defense.24 
Lastly, this article will advocate that courts, in reviewing 
healthcare mergers, should give greater weight to quality based 
efficiencies, because this will improve patient outcomes and bring 
antitrust law into accord with current healthcare policy.25 
II. UNDERSTANDING THE ISSUE 
Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (ACA) in 2010.26 The goal of the ACA was to establish a system 
of “quality, affordable healthcare for all Americans.”27 A main focus 
of the ACA was to ensure the quality of healthcare, while also 
bringing down the cost of healthcare, which would in turn provide 
greater access to healthcare services.28 The ACA’s focus was on 
improving patient outcomes, by linking payment of healthcare 
services to quality outcomes and shifting towards a prospective 
payment system rather than a retrospective payment system.29 
The ACA created a wave of changes for healthcare entities, 
including a change in fee structure and repayment, as well as 
                                                          
 22. See infra Part III. 
 23. See infra Part IV & V. 
 24. See infra Part VI.  
 25. See infra Part VII. 
 26. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
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various other requirements like electronic health records, 
Medicare requirements, and reporting requirements.30 
This drastic change to the healthcare delivery systems created 
new issues for healthcare entities to solve in order to stay 
competitive with prices and maintain their foothold in the 
healthcare market.31 Many entities began looking to mergers as a 
way to increase the efficiency of their healthcare delivery system, 
and lower costs by combining services, such as electronic health 
records.32 In turn, these mergers should mean a greater continuum 
of care for the consumer, as well as lower costs generated by the 
efficiencies of combining entities.33 
However, even if healthcare entities are meeting the goals of 
the ACA by merging, that does not mean they are in the clear. 
Healthcare entity and hospital mergers are still subject to 
antitrust law.34 As it is today, antitrust law does not make any 
exceptions for healthcare entities seeking to comply with the 
ACA.35 An illustration of this will be discussed in St. Luke’s, a case 
where a hospital acquired a physician group in order to improve 
patient outcomes.36 The decision in St. Luke’s was highly 
anticipated as the case was the first challenge of a hospital and 
physician group merger to proceed to trial.37 
                                                          
 30. Id. 
 31. Margaret E. Guerin-Calvert & Jen A. Maki, Hospital Realignment: Mergers Offer 
Significant Patient and Community Benefits, CTR. FOR HEALTHCARE ECON. & POLICY 1 (Jan. 
23, 2014), http://www.fticonsulting.com/~/media/Files/us-files/insights/reports/hospital-
realignment-mergers-offer-significant-patient-and-community-benefits.pdf. 
 32. Id.  
 33. Id. 
 34. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). 
 35. Id. 
 36. St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 37. David Garcia, In Highly-Anticipated Decision, Ninth Circuit Affirms That 
Hospital-Physician Group Merger in St. Luke’s Violated Section 7 And Casts Serious Doubt on 
584 IDAHO LAW REVIEW VOL. 53 
 
The Ninth Circuit upheld the ruling that St. Luke’s must 
divest itself from the physician group Saltzer.38 The most 
significant aspect of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling was the holding that 
casts doubt on when, if ever, a healthcare entity merger can rebut 
a prima facie violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act through post 
merger efficiencies.39 This is problematic because in a new era 
where healthcare entities are compelled to comply with the ACA, 
generating efficiencies may be the only way to meet these new 
requirements and stay in compliance with the ACA.40 
III. SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT 
“[T]he primary goal of the antitrust laws is to improve 
consumer welfare.”41 The Clayton Act was originally passed in 
1914 and was amended to prohibit all mergers that may 
substantially lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly.42 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act was also amended to control for 
monopolies and competitive restraints in areas of the market 
where the Sherman Act fell short.43 The Clayton Act also differed 
from the Sherman Act because the focus was potential 
anticompetitive effects rather than a showing of an actual effect of 
restraining trade.44 The Clayton Act is a broader provision, and 
applies more readily to hospital mergers, and is thus the focus of 
this article. 
                                                          




 38. St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 793. 
 39. Garcia, supra note 37.  
 40. See generally Brief for Professors, supra note 2. 
 41. Id. at 3.  
 42. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). 
 43. Section 7 of the Clayton Act: A Legislative History, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 766, 768 
(1952). 
 44. Glazer, supra note 6, at 1042 (citing Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United 
States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962)). The law 
review article discusses the two applications of antitrust law, both the Sherman Act, and 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act.  
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The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Department of 
Justice, and private parties can seek to enforce Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act.45 Recently, the FTC has become active in challenging 
hospital mergers.46 With the passage of the ACA causing mergers 
to become more common, the FTC began critically looking at 
mergers, and successfully blocking them, or getting an order of 
divestiture.47 
In September of 2014, the New York Times published an 
article stating that the FTC had recently been on a “winning 
streak” by winning three litigated hospital merger cases in the last 
two years.48 One in Albany, Georgia; one in Toledo, Ohio; and one 
in Rockford, Illinois.49 Additionally, the article boasts of the FTC’s 
first ever win of a case regarding a health system acquisition of a 
health group – the St. Luke’s case.50 The FTC’s continued victories 
over hospital merger cases caused the number of proposed mergers 
to slow.51 
With healthcare mergers becoming increasingly difficult to 
achieve, healthcare systems and doctors were faced with having to 
come up with other means to survive under the new impositions of 
the ACA.52 One method for survival that evolved out of the need to 
                                                          
 45. 15 U.S.C § 18; Fredric J. Entin et. al., Hospital Collaboration: The Need for an 
Appropriate Antitrust Policy, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 107, 111 (1994). 
 46. Dan Mulholland & Saheli Chakrabarty, The Effects of the Affordable Care Act 
and Other Reform Efforts on Providers, Insurers and Patients-Consequences and Hidden Issues 
of Health Reform, 85 PA. B.A. Q. 56, 59 (2014). 
 47. Robert Pear, F.T.C. Wary of Mergers by Hospitals, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2014, at 
B1. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
586 IDAHO LAW REVIEW VOL. 53 
 
rebut alleged anticompetitive effects resulting from mergers was 
the increased reliance on the efficiencies defense.53 
IV. THE EFFICIENCIES DEFENSE 
“[A] primary benefit of mergers to the economy is their 
potential to generate significant efficiencies and thus enhance the 
merged firm’s ability and incentive to compete, which may result 
in lower prices, improved quality, enhanced service, or new 
products.”54 Prior to asserting an efficiencies defense, a plaintiff 
must first establish a prima facie case that a merger is 
anticompetitive.55 Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie 
showing of a Section 7 Clayton Act violation, the burden of proof 
shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption of anticompetitive 
effects.56 The focus in St. Luke’s, as well as this article, is the 
efficiencies defense. 
A. Elements of the Efficiencies Defense 
The entity or entities seeking the merger (usually the 
defendant) carry the burden of showing that the alleged efficiencies 
created by the merger are: (1) verifiable; (2) not attributable to 
reduced output or quality; (3) merger specific; and (4) sufficient to 
outweigh the transaction’s anticompetitive effects.57 The evidence 
of the alleged efficiencies cannot be “mere speculation and 
promises about post-merger behavior.”58 Additionally, the 
defendant cannot overcome the illegality of the merger solely based 
on “self-serving assertions.”59 
In St. Luke’s, the Ninth Circuit stated that because of the high 
market concentration in the Nampa, Idaho area, the merged entity 
must show that the proposed merger would generate 
                                                          
 53. Blair & Sokol, supra note 12, at 1972. 
 54. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 
§ 10 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES]. 
 55. Olin Corp. v. F.T.C., 986 F.2d 1295, 1304–05 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 56. St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d 775, 788 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 57. See id. 
 58. F.T.C. v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 721 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 59. F.T.C. v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991). 
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“extraordinary efficiencies” to rebut anticompetitive concerns.60 
The court stated that though the merger would benefit patients, 
St. Luke’s had not provided proof of efficiencies extraordinary 
enough to rebut the prima facie case under Section 7 of the Clayton 
Act.61 
The Ninth Circuit’s ruling directly reflects the current 
dichotomy in healthcare mergers. Where some circuit courts are 
willing to give weight to the pro-competitive effects of improving 
healthcare delivery systems by recognizing post-merger 
efficiencies,62 other circuit courts are not, and focus solely on cost 
based projections. This uncertainty is leading to inconsistent and 
unpredictable merger outcomes.63 
B. Cost Based vs. Quality Efficiencies 
There are both cost based and quality based efficiencies.64 
Currently, in cases where health care entities use the efficiencies 
defense, courts primarily look at cost based efficiencies and do not 
consistently take into account quality based efficiencies.65 When 
quality based efficiencies are considered, they are often given less 
weight than the cost based efficiencies.66 This uncertain 
application of the efficiencies defense has left health care entities 
                                                          
 60. St. Luke’s, 778 F.3rd at 790 (emphasis added) (citing H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d at 
720). 
 61. Id. 
 62. The D.C. Circuit, as well as the Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have all 
recognized that an efficiencies defense may be able to rebut a prima facie showing under the 
Clayton Act. The Eighth Circuit specifically noted the procompetitive effects of a merged 
healthcare entity being able to increase the quality of care and attract quality specialists to 
the hospital. See F.T.C. v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 63. Id. (The circuit courts reach differing opinions regarding the efficiencies defense). 
 64. Id.  
 65. Blair & Sokol, supra note 11, at 1973–74. 
 66. Id. at 1973–74. 
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unable to know if, or how, to structure a merger as to avoid 
violating antitrust law.67 
This disparity between an increase in quality and a lack of 
quality efficiency recognition was demonstrated in St. Luke’s. One 
of the main arguments that St. Luke’s hospital made was the 
increase in the quality of health care that would result from the 
merging of St. Luke’s hospital with Saltzer Medical Group.68 This 
would include a change in the fee system, a new electronic health 
record system, and integrated care.69 The court stated that they 
believed that health care would be improved for patients, but that 
the efficiencies were not merger specific and dependent as to serve 
as a quality based efficiencies defense.70 
The lack of recognition and weight given to a quality based 
efficiencies defense illustrates a divide between current antitrust 
law and current health care policy. The ACA was enacted to 
improve patient outcomes, reduce costs, increase quality, and 
increase access to health care.71 However, current antitrust law 
does not give due weight to these objectives, and focuses heavily on 
cost based efficiencies, when recognizing efficiencies at all. This 
results in uncertainty in healthcare entities’ ability to merge, when 
they are merging to meet the demands placed upon them by the 
ACA. 
C. The Supreme Court’s Uncertain Ruling on the Efficiencies 
Defense 
The Supreme Court has not recognized the efficiencies defense 
as sufficient to rebut a claim under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.72 
In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court cast doubt 
                                                          
 67. Id.  
 68. St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d 775, 789 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 69. See id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010). 
 72. F.T.C. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 597 (1967). 
2017 ST. ALPHONSUS MEDICAL CENTER V. ST. LUKE’S 
HEALTH SYSTEM: THE UNCERTAIN APPLICATION OF 
THE EFFICIENCIES DEFENSE IS LEADING TO 




on whether or not the efficiencies defense should be recognized at 
all.73 
Of course, some of the results of large integrated or chain 
operations are beneficial to consumers. Their expansion is 
not rendered unlawful by the mere fact that small 
independent stores may be adversely affected. It is 
competition, not competitors, which the Act protects. But 
we cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote 
competition through the protection of viable, small, locally 
owned business. Congress appreciated that occasional 
higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance 
of fragmented industries and markets. It resolved these 
competing considerations in favor of decentralization. We 
must give effect to that decision.74 
Despite the Supreme Court’s uncertain ruling on whether or 
not an efficiencies defense will allow a merger to be successful, 
there is a trend among lower courts to recognize the existence of 
the defense.75 However, even the circuit courts that recognize the 
availability of the  efficiencies defense have not been consistent in 
upholding the defense such as to rebut a prima facie showing under 
the Clayton Act.76 This has created uncertainty in the availability 
and applicability of the efficiencies defense.  
V. THE CIRCUITS’ TAKE ON THE EFFICIENCIES DEFENSE 
                                                          
 73. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962). 
 74. Id. 
 75. See ProMedica Health Sys., Inc. v. F.T.C., 749 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2014); F.T.C. v. 
H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 720–22 (D.C. Cir. 2001); F.T.C. v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 
F.3d 1045, 1047 (8th Cir. 1999); F.T.C. v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1991). 
Each of these circuits has recognized that the efficiencies defense is a defense that can be used 
successfully in rebutting a prima facie showing under the Clayton Act. St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d 
775, 788 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 76. See ProMedica Health Sys., 749 F.3d at 559; H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d at 720; 
Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d at 1047; Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d at 1206. 
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Though the Supreme Court has not expressly recognized or 
rejected the efficiencies defense, several circuit courts have 
recognized that an efficiencies based defense may be successful in 
rebutting a prima facie showing under Section 7 of the Clayton 
Act.77 
A. D.C. Circuit 
In FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., the D.C. Circuit recognized the 
existence of the efficiencies defense, but failed to hold that the 
defendants succeeded in rebutting the plaintiff’s prima facie case.78 
The case involved a merger between the second and third largest 
producers of baby food in the United States.79 
In Heinz, the second and third largest manufacturers of jarred 
baby food sought to merge.80 Prior to the merger, the baby food 
market was dominated by three major players – Gerber, who had 
a 65% market share; Heinz, which held a 17.4% market share; and 
Beech-Nut, which held a 15.4% market share.81 Heinz and Beech-
Nut agreed to a merger where Heinz would acquire 100 percent of 
Beech-Nut’s voting securities.82 The FTC sought a preliminary 
injunction which was denied by the district court.83 The district 
court held that the merger would likely increase competition in the 
jarred baby food market in the United States.84 FTC appealed, 
                                                          
 77. See ProMedica Health Sys., 749 F.3d at 559; H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d at 720; 
Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d at 1047; Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d at 1206. Though these 
circuits have recognized the existence of the efficiencies defense, none of the circuits have 
actually held that the efficiencies defense presented was successful in rebutting the alleged 
anticompetitive effects. Even though the efficiencies defense has not yet been successful, the 
circuit courts’ recognition of the efficiencies defense shows progress towards a system of 
recognizing and giving due weight to the efficiencies defense.  
 78. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d at 720–22. 
 79. Id. at 711. 
 80. Id. at 712. 
 81. Id. at 711–12. 
 82. Id. at 712. 
 83. Id. at 713. 
 84. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d at 712, (citing Heinz Co., 116 F. Supp. 2d 190, 199 
(D.D.C. 2000)). 
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stating that the merger, if completed, would violate Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act.85 
The court stated that in order for the FTC to succeed on the 
merits, it would need to show that the merger of Heinz and Beech-
Nut would substantially lessen competition, or tend to create a 
monopoly, such to establish a prima facie showing under Section 7 
of the Clayton Act.86 The FTC could do so by establishing that the 
merged entity would result in an entity controlling an undue 
percentage share of the relevant market, and would result in an 
increase in the concentration of firms in that market.87 Thus, such 
a showing establishes a presumption that the merger is 
anticompetitive, and defendants must rebut such a presumption.88 
The D.C. Circuit held that based on the market concentration 
and the anticompetitive effects on wholesale competition, the FTC 
established a prima facie case that the merger would be 
anticompetitive,89 and that the defendants had failed to carry their 
burden of rebutting the presumption.90 
The defendants tried three defenses, including the defense of 
post-merger efficiencies.91 The defendants alleged that the 
efficiencies resulting from the merger would be used to compete 
more effectively against the leading baby food manufacturer, 
Gerber.92 The D.C. Circuit acknowledged the trend among lower 
                                                          
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. at 714. 
 87. Id. at 715. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 717–18. 
 90. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d at 718. 
 91. Id. at 720. 
 92. Id. 
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courts to recognize the defense.93 The court went on to acknowledge 
courts who have recognized the defense and the benefits of 
recognizing such a defense, including the ability of the merged firm 
to achieve lower costs than either firm could have achieved without 
the merger.94 
Despite the recognition of the efficiencies defense, the court 
ultimately found that the efficiencies defense was not sufficient as 
to rebut the prima facie case, citing that the high market 
concentration level required proof of “extraordinary efficiencies” 
which the defendants had failed to prove.95 The case was remanded 
for entry of a preliminary injunction.96 
B. Sixth Circuit 
In ProMedica Health System, Inc. v. F.T.C., the Sixth Circuit 
acknowledged that an efficiencies defense may be successful in 
rebutting a Section 7 Clayton Act claim, however, the court did not 
find such a defense in the case, because the efficiencies defense was 
not asserted.97 In ProMedica Health, there was a proposed merger 
between two of the four hospital systems in Lucas County, Ohio.98 
One of the entities was the county’s dominant hospital provider, 
and the other was an independent community hospital.99 The two 
entities merged in 2010, leaving the combined entity with a large 
percentage share of the relevant market.100 After an extensive 
hearing, an administrative law judge and the Commission found 
that the merger would be anticompetitive in violation of Section 7 
and ordered the two entities to divest.101 
                                                          
 93. Id.  
 94. Id. (citing Efficiencies, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (June 25, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/4-efficiencies). 
 95. Id. 
 96. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d at 727. 
 97. ProMedica Health Sys., Inc. v. F.T.C., 749 F.3d 559, 572 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 98. Id. at 561–62. 
 99. Id. 
100. Id. at 563. 
101. Id. at 564. 
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The merged entity (ProMedica) petitioned for a review of the 
order of divestiture.102 The Sixth Circuit Court found that the 
plaintiff had succeeded in establishing a prima facie case by 
showing a Section 7 Clayton Act violation due to the 
anticompetitive effects of the merger.103 Because a prima facie case 
had been established, it was up to ProMedica to rebut the 
presumption of anticompetitive effects.104 
ProMedica asserted several defenses, however it did not assert 
an efficiencies based defense.105 The court here noted that it was 
“remarkable” that the defendants did not assert an efficiencies 
defense.106 The court stated that parties seeking an efficiencies 
defense often argue that the efficiencies enhance consumer welfare 
by lowering prices.107 The court went on to talk about consumer 
welfare, and the beneficial impact that merger generated 
efficiencies can have on lowering prices, improving quality, and 
enhancing services.108 In finding that the defendants failed to rebut 
the presumption of a Clayton Act violation, the Sixth Circuit noted 
the lack of an asserted efficiencies defense.109 
C. Eighth Circuit 
In F.T.C. v. Tenet Health Care Corp., the Eighth Circuit found 
that an efficiencies defense may be able to rebut a Section 7 
claim.110 In Tenet Health Care Corp., two hospitals in southeastern 
                                                          
102. Id. 
103. ProMedica Health Sys., 749 F.3d at 561. 
104. Id. at 571. 
105. Id.  
106. Id.  
107. Id.  
108. Id.  
109. ProMedica Health Sys., 749 F.3d at 572. 
110. F.T.C. v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1047 (8th Cir. 1999). 
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Missouri sought to merge, but the FTC sought and was granted a 
preliminary injunction preventing them from doing so.111 The 
merged entity appealed to the Eight Circuit.112 
The Eighth Circuit noted that even if the district court rejected 
Tenet’s efficiencies defense, those efficiencies should have been 
considered in the context of the competitive effects of the merger.113 
The court found that the increased efficiencies generated from 
combining entities would result in better medical care.114 
Additionally, the court noted that the increase in the quality 
of medical care would help in attracting highly qualified providers 
and specialists which could in turn increase competition through 
integrated delivery and tertiary care.115 “In view of the significant 
changes experienced by the hospital industry in the recent past 
and the profound changes likely facing the industry in the near 
future, . . . a merger, deemed anticompetitive today, could be 
considered procompetitive tomorrow.”116 
The Eighth Circuit noted that “the merged entity may well 
enhance competition in the greater Southeast Missouri area.”117 
The court reversed the district court’s enjoining of the merger, and 
remanded the case for proceedings consistent with the opinion. 118 
D. Eleventh Circuit 
The Eleventh Circuit held that in certain circumstances, 
showing significant efficiencies generated by a merger could rebut 
the prima facie case of a Clayton Act violation.119 In F.T.C. v. 
                                                          
111. Id.  
112. Id.  
113. Id. at 1054. 
114. Id.  
115. Id. 
116. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d at 1047 (citing United States v. Mercy Health 
Servs., 107 F.3d 632, 636 (8th Cir. 1997)). 
117. Id. at 1055. 
118. Id.  
119. F.T.C. v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1991). 
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University Health, Inc., University Hospital wanted to acquire the 
assets of St. Joseph Hospital, which was a nonprofit entity.120 The 
FTC sought a preliminary injunction to prevent hospital operators 
from acquiring the assets of another hospital, as the FTC alleged 
that this would result in lessened competition.121 The district court 
denied the preliminary injunction, and the FTC appealed.122 
The Eleventh Circuit held that Section 7 of the Clayton Act 
applied to asset acquisitions by non-profit hospitals, and that the 
FTC had established a prima facie case that the hospital failed to 
rebut with a showing of significant efficiencies.123 The hospital 
argued that the acquisition would result in significant efficiencies, 
so the merger would not substantially lessen competition.124 The 
FTC responded by saying the law would not recognize the 
efficiency defense in any form.125 The court held that “in certain 
circumstances, a defendant may rebut the government’s prima 
facie case with evidence showing that the intended merger would 
create significant efficiencies in the relevant market.”126 
The hospital went on to state that the merger would reduce 
“unnecessary duplication” between the two entities and therefore 
reduced costs.127 However, the court found that efficiencies claimed 
had no proof of sustainability of benefit to consumers.128 
                                                          
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 1206. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 1220. 
124. Id. at 1222. 
125. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d at 1222. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 1223. 
128. Id. 
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Ultimately, the court held that “an efficiency defense . . . may 
be used in certain cases to rebut the government’s prima facie 
showing in a [S]ection 7 challenge . . .” but that the appellees could 
not use the defense in the current case because they had failed to 
demonstrate that their acquisition would produce significant 
economies.129 
E. Ninth Circuit 
The Ninth Circuit in St. Luke’s departed somewhat from the 
view of its sister circuits that had recognized the efficiencies 
defense.130 While the court did briefly entertain the idea that the 
efficiencies defense may exist, its analysis of the St. Luke’s case 
made it clear that the court was skeptical of the defense, and the 
success of the defense was unlikely.131 
The court, in the beginning of the St. Luke’s opinion, notes that 
“[t]he status of the defense in this circuit remains uncertain.”132 
The Ninth Circuit went on to state “[w]e remain skeptical about 
the efficiencies defense in general and about its scope in particular. 
It is difficult enough in § 7 cases to predict whether a merger will 
have future anticompetitive effects without also adding to the 
judicial balance a prediction of future efficiencies.”133 
The court noted that an entity could combine to form a more 
efficient entity and therefore increase competition. “In other words, 
a successful efficiencies defense requires proof that a merger is not, 
despite the existence of a prima facie case, anticompetitive.”134 
St. Luke's argues that the merger would benefit patients by 
creating a team of employed physicians with access to Epic, 
the electronic medical records system used by St. Luke's. 
The district court found that, even if true, these predicted 
                                                          
129. Id. at 1223–24. 
130. St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d 775, 789 (9th Cir. 2015). 
131. Id. 
132. Id. at 789. 
133. Id. at 790. 
134. Id.  
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efficiencies were insufficient to carry St. Luke's' burden of 
rebutting the prima facie case. We agree.  
It is not enough to show that the merger would allow St. 
Luke's to better serve patients. The Clayton Act focuses on 
competition, and the claimed efficiencies therefore must 
show that the prediction of anticompetitive effects from the 
prima facie case is inaccurate.135 
The court went on to echo the district court’s finding that the 
merger would be beneficial to patient care, and would improve the 
delivery of healthcare in the Nampa area.136 However, the court 
ultimately found that the efficiencies generated were not merger 
specific and did not increase competition.137 The court went on to 
say that even if the efficiencies were merger specific, “[a]t most, the 
district court concluded that St. Luke's might provide better 
service to patients after the merger. That is a laudable goal, 
but the Clayton Act does not excuse mergers that lessen 
competition or create monopolies simply because the merged entity 
can improve its operations.”138 St. Luke’s was ordered to divest 
from Saltzer.139 
The Ninth Circuit mentioned several times the beneficial 
impact that the merger would have on patient care, and healthcare 
delivery in Nampa Idaho.140 However, the court focused solely on 
cost based projections in assessing St. Luke’s presentation of the 
efficiencies defense.141 The court did not take into account the 
quality based efficiencies, nor did it take into account the effects of 
                                                          
135. St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 791. 
136. Id. 
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138. Id. at 792. 
139. Id. at 793. 
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the recently passed ACA on healthcare entities.142 This illustrates 
the need for antitrust law to be updated and harmonized with the 
healthcare market as it is in a post-ACA world. The St. Luke’s case 
will be examined in greater detail below. 
VI. ST. ALPHONSUS V. ST. LUKE’S: A BACKGROUND OF 
THE CASE 
As was briefly mentioned previously, the St. Luke’s case 
involved a hospital acquisition of a physician group in Nampa, 
Idaho and a Ninth Circuit ruling on the challenged merger.143 
Nampa, Idaho is the second largest city in the state of Idaho, and 
is located about twenty miles west of Boise.144 Prior to the merger 
at issue, St. Luke’s Health Systems, Ltd. (St. Luke’s) was operating 
as a non-profit health care system, with an emergency clinic in 
Nampa.145 Saltzer Medical Group (Saltzer), “the largest 
independent multi-specialty physician group in Idaho, had thirty-
four physicians practicing in Nampa.”146 
At the time of the merger, the only hospital in Nampa was 
operated by Saint Alphonsus Health System, Inc. (St. 
Alphonsus).147 Saltzer was “the largest adult primary care 
physician (PCP) provider in Nampa, with sixteen PCPs.”148 St. 
Luke’s had eight PCPs and St. Alphonsus had nine PCPs.149 
A. The Merger 
Saltzer had wanted to integrate patient care and move 
towards risk based reimbursement, and sought to merge with a 
                                                          
142. Id.  
143. Id. at 789. 
144. Id. at 781. 
145. St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 781. 
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large health care system.150 The physician group needed to upgrade 
its medical record system to stay current with the industry, but 
could not afford to do so on its own.151 Saltzer had previously tried 
to merge with other entities, but was unsuccessful.152 
In 2012, St. Luke’s purchased Saltzer’s assets and entered into 
a five-year service agreement.153 The agreement stated that both 
organizations wanted to discontinue fee-for-service 
reimbursement.154 However, the agreement did not include any 
provisions to implement that goal, but was revised to contain some 
quality based incentives.155 The merger did not require Saltzer to 
refer to St. Luke’s or to use St. Luke’s facilities.156 
In March 2013, St. Alphonsus filed a complaint seeking to 
enjoin the merger under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, citing 
anticompetitive effects in the relevant market of Nampa.157 The 
district court denied the preliminary injunction, reasoning that the 
agreement between Saltzer and St. Luke’s did not require referrals 
                                                          
150. St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 781. 
151. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr. - Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd. (St. 
Luke’s District Court Decision), No. 1:12-CV-00560-BLW, 2014 WL 407446, at *3 (D. Idaho 
Jan. 24, 2014), aff’d, 778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2015). 
152. Id.  
153. St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 781. 
154. Fee-for-service reimbursement is a payment system where healthcare providers 
are paid for every service they perform, such as an office visit, a physical examination, or a 
test. Fee-for-Service, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chip-program-information/by-topics/delivery-systems/fee-
for-service.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2016). The opposite of this is a prospective payment 
system, where healthcare providers are paid a predetermined, fixed amount based on a 
classification system. See Prospective Payment Systems - General Information, CTRS. FOR 
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/medicare/medicare-fee-for-service-
payment/prospmedicarefeesvcpmtgen/index.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2016).  
155. St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 782. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. 
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to St. Luke’s; the agreement would take place over time; and the 
agreement provided a process for unwinding if so ordered.158 
Also in March of 2013, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
and State of Idaho filed a complaint in district court “to enjoin the 
merger pursuant to the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA), 
the Clayton Act, and Idaho Law.”159 The complaint cited 
anticompetitive effects in the PCP market in Nampa.160 This case 
was consolidated with the case brought by St. Alphonsus.161 
B. The District Court’s Determination 
The Idaho district court held a nineteen-day bench trial.162 St. 
Luke’s argument focused heavily on the efficiencies the merger 
would create, and how those efficiencies would outweigh any 
anticompetitive effects.163 The district court held that St. Luke’s 
needed to provide convincing proof of merger specific efficiencies 
that arose as a result of the merger, and were thus, merger 
specific.164 
The district court discussed the ever-changing United States 
healthcare system, and found that St. Luke’s and Saltzer 
genuinely wanted to improve patient outcomes through merging 
the two entities.165 However, the court noted that the huge market 
share the merged entity would occupy created a substantial risk of 
anticompetitive price increases in the Nampa PCP market.166 The 
court rejected St. Luke’s argument that the post-merger 
                                                          
158. Id. 
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160. St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 782. 
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efficiencies outweighed potential price increases, and the court 
ordered divestiture.167 
After the district court ordered St. Luke’s and Saltzer to 
divest, St. Luke’s appealed.168 The Ninth Circuit, in a highly 
anticipated decision, ultimately upheld the district court’s 
determination that St. Luke’s had to divest from Saltzer.169 
C. The Ninth Circuit’s Ruling 
Prior to the decision in the St. Luke’s case, the Ninth Circuit 
rejected the recognition of the efficiencies defense in a decision over 
thirty years ago.170 The Ninth Circuit admitted that it remained 
skeptical of the defense, noting difficulties in foreseeing the 
outcome of the alleged efficiencies.171 
In the present case, the Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiffs 
had established a prima facie case of a Section 7 violation under 
the Clayton Act.172 The court looked to the high market share, the 
ability of St. Luke’s to charge hospital rates for ancillary services, 
and the ability to negotiate higher primary care reimbursement 
rates from insurers.173 “Because the plaintiffs established a prima 
facie case, the burden shifted to St. Luke’s to” rebut the alleged 
                                                          
167. Id. Divestiture, as it is used here, means essentially to unwind, meaning St. 
Luke’s would no longer possess Saltzer. Divestiture, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2016), 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/divestiture. 
168. St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 782. 
169. Id. at 793. 
170. Id. at 789 (citing RSR Corp. v. F. T. C., 602 F.2d 1317, 1325 (9th Cir. 1979)). The 
difference in that case, however, was that the argument put forth was that the efficiencies 
would allow the defendant to compete outside the market, whereas more recent cases, as well 
as St. Luke’s, are using the efficiencies defense to justify competing inside the market. Id. 
171. Id. at 790. 
172. Id. at 786. A prima facie case is established if the plaintiff proves that the merger 
will probably lead to anticompetitive effects in that market. Id. at 785. 
173. St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 786. 
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anticompetitive effects.174 St. Luke’s relied heavily on its assertion 
of the post-merger efficiencies that would be generated and the 
procompetitive effects of those efficiencies.175 St. Luke’s also urged 
that the merger would allow St. Luke’s to move toward integrated 
care, and risk-based reimbursement.176 
Ultimately, the claimed post-merger efficiencies by St. Luke’s 
was not enough to carry the day, and the Ninth Circuit upheld the 
district court’s order of divestiture.177 The Ninth Circuit began by 
looking at the Supreme Court’s take on the efficiencies defense, 
and pointed out that the Supreme Court has never expressly 
recognized efficiencies as a defense to a Section 7 Clayton Action 
violation.178 The Ninth Circuit also looked to the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co. where the Supreme Court 
stated, “[p]ossible economies cannot be used as a defense to 
illegality. Congress was aware that some mergers which lessen 
competition may also result in economies but it struck the balance 
in favor of protecting competition.”179 
Though the Ninth Circuit read the Supreme Court’s ruling as 
precluding an efficiencies defense, the court did acknowledge that 
four other circuits (D.C., Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh) have 
suggested that post-merger efficiencies can rebut a Clayton Act 
Section 7 prima facie case.180 However, the court specifically noted 
                                                          
174. Id. at 788. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. at 785.  
178. Id. at 789 (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962)). 
179. F.T.C. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967). 
180. St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 789. The Ninth Circuit did go on to point out that though 
the four circuits recognized the existence of a post-merger efficiencies defense to a prima face 
showing under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, none of those circuits actually held that a 
defendant succeeded in rebutting a Section 7 prima facie claim. Id. However, the Eighth 
Circuit noted: 
[A]lthough Tenet’s efficiencies defense may have been properly rejected by 
the district court, the district court should nonetheless have considered 
evidence of enhanced efficiency in the context of the competitive effects of 
the merger. The evidence shows that a hospital that is larger and more 
efficient than Lucy Lee or Doctors’ Regional will provide better medical 
care than either of those hospitals could separately. The merged entity 
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that even the circuits who have recognized the existence of the 
efficiencies defense have not actually held that a defendant 
succeeded in rebutting a Section 7 prima facie case.181 Therefore, 
the court said, “thus, even in those circuits that recognize [the 
defense], the parameters of the defense remain imprecise.182 
The Ninth Circuit went on to say that the status of the defense 
in the Ninth Circuit remained uncertain.183 The Ninth Circuit 
stated their skepticism of the defense and its scope, but stated that 
because Section 7 of the Clayton Act only prohibits mergers that 
substantially lessen competition, a defendant could theoretically 
rebut a prima facie case with evidence of a more efficient, combined 
entity that increases competition.184 The court went on to say that 
courts who have recognized the defense require the defendant to 
clearly demonstrate that the merger would enhance rather than 
hinder competition because of the increased efficiencies.185 The 
court said that because Section 7 of the Clayton Act seeks to avert 
monopolies, “extraordinary efficiencies” must be shown and the 
efficiencies must be merger specific.186 
St. Luke’s argued that the merger would benefit patients 
through an integrated care system and the use of improved 
electronic health care records.187 The Ninth Circuit held that even 
                                                          
will be able to attract more highly qualified physicians and specialists and 
to offer integrated delivery and some tertiary care.  
F.T.C. v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045,1054 (8th Cir. 1999). 
181. St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 789. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. at 790.  
185. Id. (citing United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F.Supp. 121, 137 
(E.D.N.Y. 1997)). 
186. St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 789. 
187. Id. at 791 
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if true, the predicted efficiencies were insufficient to rebut the 
prima facie case.188 The court held that “it is not enough to show 
that the merger would allow St. Luke’s to better serve patients. 
The Clayton Act focuses on competition, and the claimed 
efficiencies therefore must show that the prediction of 
anticompetitive effects from the prima facie case is inaccurate.”189 
The court upheld the district court’s finding that the merger, 
though likely to improve patient outcomes, would not increase 
competition or decrease prices.190 The court also upheld the district 
court’s finding that the efficiencies were not merger specific, 
stating that there was no evidence St. Luke’s needed to merge to 
integrate care.191 The court concluded the discussion of St. Luke’s 
efficiencies defense by saying that even if the efficiencies were 
merger specific, the defense would still fail because improving 
operations does not allow an entity to lessen competition.192 The 
court affirmed the district court’s order that St. Luke’s divest from 
Saltzer.193 
VII. ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT LAW AND 
SUGGESTIONS FOR SOLUTIONS 
The analysis of this article will focus on antitrust law as it is 
today, and the role that the efficiencies defense plays in healthcare 
merger analysis under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. The analysis 
will also look at the implications and goals of the ACA, and how 
the uncertain and inconsistent application of the efficiencies 
defense is not improving consumer welfare, or bringing the 
healthcare industry into accord with current healthcare policy. The 
analysis will explain the benefits of making healthcare merger 
review less stringent, namely by giving increased weight to quality 
based efficiencies. Making it easier for healthcare mergers to 
survive challenges is essential to moving towards integrated 
healthcare, and compliance with the ACA. 
A. Under Current Antitrust Law, When, if Ever, Can Post Merger 
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Efficiencies, That Allegedly Improve Patient Outcomes and 
Enhance Competition, Succeed in Rebutting a Section 7 Clayton 
Act Violation? 
In the new post-ACA world, many healthcare entities, 
providers, and hospitals are seeking to merge as a way to survive 
under the new impositions of the ACA. The issue here is if a 
hospital or healthcare entity that wants to merge can ever rely on 
an argument of post-merger efficiencies to rebut a prima facie 
showing of a Section 7 Clayton Act violation. 
The Supreme Court, as noted earlier, has not specifically 
recognized the viability of the efficiencies defense but has 
acknowledged the trend among lower courts to recognize such a 
defense.194 The Supreme Court’s lack of ruling on the issue, and the 
indecision in application among the circuit courts, leaves 
healthcare entities in antitrust limbo, unsure if a merger would be 
successful or not.195 The trend among the circuit courts has been to 
recognize the existence of the defense and its viability, though in 
most cases the Court does not find the defense successful in 
rebutting the prima facie case.196 
Despite the Supreme Court’s lack of guidance, there has been 
a trend in the circuit courts and some district courts to recognize 
an efficiencies defense as a viable option, though the courts have 
still rarely, if ever, held that a defendant has succeeded in showing 
efficiencies capable of rebutting the government’s prima facie 
                                                          
194. F.T.C. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 597 (1967). 
195. See Glazer, supra note 6, at 1043 (noting the different approaches taken in two 
circuit courts analyzing a Section 7 issue). 
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case.197 The idea, or illusion, of an efficiencies defense is almost 
unattainable, as shown by the circuit courts.198 The courts are 
willing to acknowledge that an efficiencies defense exists, but not 
to apply the defense.  
The Eighth Circuit, in F.T.C. v. Tenet Health Care Corp., was 
one circuit that was willing to recognize the defense as well as hold 
that the defendants had successfully shown efficiencies that should 
have been taken into account by the district court.199 The court, in 
reaching its decision, focused on how improving medical facilities 
and care would attract higher quality doctors, and in turn those 
higher quality doctors would increase competition with 
surrounding health care entities.200 This case seems to suggest that 
it’s not just direct efficiencies that benefit the consumer that the 
courts should be concerned with. Instead, the indirect benefits, 
such as attracting higher quality providers that in turn increase 
competition should also interest the courts.201 
In applying this reasoning to the decision in St. Luke’s, it 
seems that if the case had been decided in the Eighth Circuit, 
versus the Ninth, the decision may have been in favor of the 
merger. Since St. Luke’s would be providing integrated care, as 
well as a broader scope of care to Saltzer patients that Saltzer could 
not provide on their own, similar to the merger in F.T.C. v. Tenet 
Health Care Corp, the decision may have gone the other way.202 
The Eighth Circuit also considered as part of the efficiencies 
defense, the fact that the merged entity would be able to provide 
tertiary care, something that neither health care entity would be 
                                                          
197. See ProMedica Health Sys., 749 F.3d 559; H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d at 720; Tenet 
Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1047; Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206. 
198. See ProMedica Health Sys., 749 F.3d 559; H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d at 720; Tenet 
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able to provide on their own without the merger.203 The tertiary 
care that was to be provided would be a direct result of, and 
dependent upon, the two entities merging.204 This new merged 
system would likely have resulted in an increased quality of care, 
thus increasing competition through patient satisfaction.205 This 
was a point argued in St. Luke’s, with the argument being made 
that the merger would allow a team of St. Luke’s and Saltzer 
physicians to have access to an electronic records system which 
would result in a higher quality of integrated care.206 The court 
expressly rejected this argument, noting that “It is not enough that 
the merger would allow St. Luke’s to better serve patients.”207 The 
court went on to write that the only concern is competition, and 
that the efficiencies claimed needed to rebut the anticompetitive 
effects of the merger.208 
The circuit court’s rulings help to illustrate the divide and 
uncertainty that exists in healthcare merger law as it is today. The 
lack of consistent recognition of the efficiencies defense causes 
confusion and inconsistency in healthcare mergers and does not 
reflect current healthcare policy that seeks to improve patient 
outcomes and integrate care. 
B. What Does This Mean for Healthcare Entities Trying to Stay 
in Compliance With the Affordable Care Act? 
A healthcare entity seeking to merge in order to meet the 
demands of the ACA needs to be wary of counting on the 
efficiencies defense to uphold the merger.209 For an entity to 
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204. See Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d at 1054. 
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206. St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d 775, 791 (9th Cir. 2015). 
207. Id. 
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succeed using post-merger efficiencies defense, the efficiencies 
need to be: (1) verifiable; (2) not attributable to reduced output or 
quality; (3) merger specific; and (4) sufficient to outweigh the 
transaction’s anticompetitive effects.210 
What this actually means for entities varies depending on 
what circuit they are in, as the application of the defense remains 
uncertain.211 What is clear is that the efficiencies shown need to be 
substantial and more than mere speculation or hopes for cost 
savings.212 The efficiencies need to be specific in articulating to the 
court exactly how, and why, the merger should be allowed to go 
forward despite the prima facie case.213 The best example of this 
was in F.T.C. v. Tenet Health Care Corp., where the Eighth Circuit 
found that an efficiencies defense may be able to rebut the prima 
facie case because of the increased ability of the merged entity to 
attract qualified providers, which would in turn enhance 
competition.214 As noted above, several circuits have held that the 
efficiencies defense could be able to rebut a prima facie showing of 
the Clayton Act, whereas the Ninth Circuit has made it clear that 
an efficiencies defense would be very difficult to successfully allege 
and prove.215 
Entities wanting to merge in order to comply with the ACA 
need to be aware that the FTC is actively monitoring such 
mergers.216 For an entity wanting to merge, there are other 
defenses to a Clayton Act violation besides just efficiencies, and it 
                                                          
749 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2014); F.T.C. v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 720 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Tenet 
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210. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d at 721. 
211. See ProMedica Health Sys., 749 F.3d 559; H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d at 720; Tenet 
Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1047; Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206. 
212. See ProMedica Health Sys., 749 F.3d 559; H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d at 720; Tenet 
Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1047; Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206. 
213. See ProMedica Health Sys., 749 F.3d 559; H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d at 720; Tenet 
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186 F.3d at 1054.  
216. Pear, supra note 47. 
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is possible that one of those defenses could allow the merger to 
continue. However, should a party to a proposed merger seek to 
hinge its defense on a claim of efficiencies, it needs to be prepared 
for stringent testing and examining of the efficiencies claimed.217 
Entities seeking to merge can of course seek other avenues to 
achieve the goals of the merger without actually merging. This can 
be difficult, as the entity that is seeking to merge has often 
exhausted other options, or will be better served through a 
merger.218 
For consumers, the strict application of the efficiencies defense 
has pros as well as cons. The main benefit to consumers is the strict 
avoidance of healthcare monopolies being formed through 
mergers.219 This can have a short-term benefit to consumers by 
temporarily keeping costs down and forcing competition.220 
However, as we move forward in a post-ACA world, the negative 
implications from the strict application of the efficiencies defense 
will outweigh the benefit of strictly avoiding anything resembling 
a monopoly. 
America is moving towards a healthcare model of integrated 
care, with electronic health records and an ever increasing number 
of specialists.221 What this means is that healthcare entities will 
need to merge to provide integrated care and to keep costs down by 
lowering the overhead associated with running multiple entities. 
Allowing healthcare entities who have demonstrated cost-based 
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and quality-based efficiencies to merge can help integrate 
healthcare, and move towards improving patient outcomes. 
C. Current Antitrust Law is Inconsistent with Healthcare Policy 
While the passage of the ACA was a controversial issue, the 
main goal of the legislature in passing the ACA was simple: get all 
Americans access to the healthcare they need, and improve the 
quality of the healthcare Americans receive.222 Antitrust law, as it 
is today, is a barrier to achieving these goals. 
The way that the legislature chose to achieve its goal of 
improving healthcare was to pass a law that put new burdens on 
consumers as well as on healthcare entities and providers.223 
Consumers would be required to obtain health care coverage, 
whereas providers would be held to a host of new requirements.224 
Healthcare entities were to improve patients’ outcomes through 
quality reporting methods, changing fee structure, and increasing 
provider accountability.225 
The healthcare industry was understaffed and overworked 
before the passage of the ACA, with there already being a shortage 
of healthcare workers.226 As a wave of newly insured patients 
began seeking healthcare, entities and providers began to feel the 
practical and economic pressures from the new requirements of the 
ACA.227 
Of course, doctors, nurses, and other medical professionals 
want to help people in need, but the sheer logistics of 
expanded care delivery, the current and growing shortage 
of personnel, and limited resources will certainly undercut 
                                                          
222. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-48, 124 Stat. 119, 
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the good intentions of the policymakers who crafted the 
national health law. In fact, the “transformational” changes 
touted by the law’s champions will likely complicate and 
negatively affect health care workers and their ability to 
provide care. These changes will increase regulatory 
burdens, increase already heavy workloads, reduce 
payments, impose new penalties, and disregard personal 
preferences and values. The increased stress will further 
destabilize the health care industry.228 
One of the ways healthcare entities sought to remedy this 
situation was through healthcare mergers, which would allow for 
a combined sharing of costs, the ability to afford specialized 
medical equipment, as well as integrated care.229 The economic 
pressures put forth by the ACA have increased the consolidation 
rate of providers and entities.230 In 2014, 32.8% of physicians 
worked directly for a hospital, an increase from 29% in 2012.231 The 
trend shows physicians moving from owning their own practices to 
working for, or merging with, hospitals.232 The consolidation trends 
have caused consumers to fear monopolies that will raise prices.233 
Hospitals, however, maintain that consolidation will control cost 
and enhance quality, keeping healthcare entities in accord with the 
ACA.234 
Healthcare mergers allow providers and hospitals to stay 
financially viable in a time of new regulation and restrictions 
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brought about by the ACA.235 “Hospitals, individual physicians, 
group practices, and other health care businesses are merging and 
consolidating to remain strong in the marketplace. Mergers and 
acquisitions reduce overhead costs for billing and claims while 
spreading out the financial risk and increasing market share.”236 
By creating a barrier to considering quality-enhancing 
efficiencies associated with better care, the approach taken 
by the [Ninth Circuit] will deter future provider 
realignment and create a "chilling" effect on vital provider 
integration and collaboration. If the Panel’s decision is 
upheld, providers will be considerably less likely to engage 
in realignment aimed at improving care and lowering long-
term costs. As a result, both patients and payors will suffer 
in the form of higher costs and lower quality of care. This 
can’t be – and isn’t – the outcome to which appropriate 
antitrust law and policy aspires.237 
Of course, as these entities continue to merge, the concern of 
healthcare monopolies is a legitimate possibility. The issue is not 
that these entities should not be subjected to antitrust law, 
specifically the Section 7 of the Clayton Act; the issue is that when 
these merged entities are evaluated under the Clayton Act, the 
efficiencies generated by the merger—both cost based, as well as 
quality—are not given consistent, and deserving weight. The 
stringent examination of these entities under current antitrust law 
does not take into account the benefit that the merged entity can 
provide to the consumer through increased efficiencies and better 
quality care. 
When the merged entity forms, the merged entity generates 
efficiencies that come from consolidation.238 These efficiencies 
result in cost savings that make the entity more competitive in 
their market.239 The merged entity also may generate quality based 
efficiencies that allow it to provide a better quality of product or 
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care.240 These efficiencies, both cost based and quality based, can 
benefit consumers as well as increase competition through better 
prices and a better quality of care.241 However, because the 
Supreme Court has not expressly ruled on the efficiencies defense, 
the defense is being applied inconsistently among lower courts. 
This leaves entities whose merger rests on the efficiencies defense, 
unsure of what the outcome will be if their merger is challenged.242 
D. The Solution: Healthcare Entities Merger Specific Quality 
Efficiencies Should be Given More Weight in Determining 
Procompetitive Effects of the Merger 
Enhancing consumer welfare is one of the main purposes of 
the Clayton Act.243 Consumer welfare includes more than just cost 
considerations; it also includes well-being and access to quality 
healthcare.244 “Antitrust merger enforcement turns on predictions 
of likely competitive effects. The government must demonstrate a 
substantial likelihood of anticompetitive effects and that these 
effects are not outweighed by likely consumer benefits.”245 “[T]he 
primary goal of the antitrust laws is to improve consumer welfare. 
The efficiencies defense has arisen as a key tool in modern 
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antitrust law to ensure that over-enforcement does not preclude 
arrangements that enhance consumer welfare.”246 
Healthcare entities, in light of the ACA, merge in order to 
combine overhead costs, streamline care, and integrate healthcare 
delivery. “Integration, including hospital systems acquiring 
general and specialized practice systems, provides the most cost 
effective and efficient way for providers to align incentives, share 
information, adopt higher value programs, and increase 
investments in patient-oriented care.”247 Healthcare mergers can 
benefit consumers by keeping costs lower through combining 
entities, as well as streamlining and integrating care.248 
Integration is crucial to bending the cost curve and 
improving overall healthcare delivery. Healthcare policies 
and recently enacted laws [the ACA] have begun to bring 
about a transformational change in healthcare: the decline 
of a volume-based, fee-for-service approach in favor of a 
value-based, patient-oriented one. This approach 
encourages delivery system reform and integration of care 
in a number of ways including formation of accountable care 
organizations, bundled payments, reduced hospital 
payments for readmissions, and valued-based payment 
systems in Medicare and Medicaid.249 
In light of the numerous benefits to consumer welfare that are 
achieved through healthcare mergers, the courts, when reviewing 
challenged healthcare mergers, should be more stringent in 
finding that the plaintiff has succeeded in establishing a prima 
facie case showing anticompetitive effects from the merger.250 A 
stringent review of the plaintiff’s prima facie showing of alleged 
anticompetitive effects will help to safeguard mergers whose 
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alleged anticompetitive effects are minimal in comparison to the 
benefits the merger will provide to consumers. 
However, if a prima facie case is established, the courts should 
then give greater weight to the merged entities’ use of an 
efficiencies based defense, specifically quality based efficiencies.251 
“A primary benefit of mergers to the economy is their potential to 
generate significant efficiencies and thus enhance the merged 
firm’s ability and incentive to compete, which may result in lower 
prices, improved quality, enhanced service, or new products.”252 The 
merger guidelines state that improved quality and enhanced 
service are primary benefits of efficiencies generated by healthcare 
mergers.253 Therefore, to be in accord with antitrust law, as well as 
sound policy, it is imperative that quality improvements, and 
enhanced service, are taken into account when reviewing a merged 
entity’s efficiencies. 
Merged healthcare entities often generate procompetitive 
efficiencies via quality efficiencies, through offering integrated 
care, tertiary care, more services, and better specialists.254 These 
quality measures allow the merged entity to better compete in the 
marketplace, and therefore may rebut alleged anticompetitive 
effects.255 
[The Ninth Circuit’s] decision will signal to market 
participants that the efficiencies defense is essentially 
unavailable in the Ninth Circuit, especially if those 
efficiencies go towards improving quality. Companies 
contemplating a merger designed to make each party more 
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efficient will be unable to rely on an efficiencies defense and 
will therefore abandon transactions that promote consumer 
welfare lest they fall victim to the sort of reasoning 
employed by the panel in this case.256 
Providing a consistent and predictable framework for 
healthcare mergers will allow entities seeking to merge the ability 
to predict the success of their merger, and will therefore decrease 
needless litigation and confusion.257 Additionally, as it is now, 
mergers that benefit consumer welfare may often not be 
undertaken, due to the uncertainty regarding potential challenges 
to the merger.258 Adopting a framework that is 1) certain and 
predictable in its application, and 2) in favor of advancing 
beneficial healthcare mergers, will benefit consumers by 
promoting consolidations that increase healthcare integration and 
decrease costs.259 
To achieve the benefits of integrated healthcare, and still 
remain cognizant of antitrust concerns, this article suggests the 
following approach to determine whether or not a merged entity 
should be ordered to divest. When a healthcare merger is 
challenged, the reviewing court should balance the alleged 
anticompetitive effects of the merger with the benefits the merger 
will provide, giving increased weight to improved consumer 
welfare and quality based efficiencies. The reviewing court should 
consider the potential benefit to consumers. This will include 
decreased overall costs, increased access to healthcare providers 
and specialists, an increase in integrated care, and increased 
compliance with the ACA.260 The reviewing court will also look at 
the potential detriment to consumers, focusing on an increase in 
pricing power without the benefits mentioned previously. If the 
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benefits to consumers outweigh the potential detriments, the 
merger should be upheld. This approach does not greatly depart 
from antitrust law as it is today. The main difference is that this 
approach takes into account all benefits to consumers, including 
an increased quality of healthcare. 
The dangerous healthcare monopolies that threaten consumer 
welfare will still be kept at bay through this new system of 
analysis, but entities who will benefit consumers through 
integrated care and improved healthcare delivery, should have 
their cost and quality-based efficiencies recognized as beneficial to 
consumers. 
Hospital mergers offer substantial benefits for patients and 
communities. . . . All too frequently, conventional wisdom 
suggested by media coverage is that hospital realignment, 
mergers and consolidations systematically result in pricing 
power, with anticompetitively higher prices for those 
needing care. Yet, in terms of prices for consumers, this 
study’s extensive review of the literature finds no consistent 
statistical relationship between consolidation patterns and 
hospital prices across the studies.261 
Currently, the efficiencies defense, both cost based and quality 
based, is often given little weight and an inconsistent application 
in antitrust analysis by the courts. This leads to unpredictability 
in healthcare mergers, and serves as a barrier to bringing the 
healthcare industry into accord with healthcare policy, namely the 
ACA. Revising the way that the efficiencies defense is analyzed in 
healthcare merger cases, as well as giving increased consideration 
to consumer welfare, will help to bring antitrust law into accord 
with current healthcare policy, and will serve consumers by 
recognizing the benefits derived from a system with integrated 
care. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
The passage of the ACA brought about radical changes 
impacting how consumers purchase healthcare, as well as how 
healthcare is delivered to consumers.262 These changes in the 
healthcare industry require that a new approach to healthcare 
mergers be developed in order to move towards a better system of 
healthcare in America. Reexamining how healthcare mergers will 
be assessed will bring antitrust law into accord with current 
healthcare policy, as well as benefit consumers through a 
healthcare model that focuses on integrated care and streamlined 
services. 
Some circuits have recognized the efficiencies defense, 
whereas others have cast doubt on whether or not the efficiencies 
defense exists, or is a viable defense.263 This inconsistency 
increases litigation regarding healthcare mergers, and does not 
serve to improve patient care. 
The Ninth Circuit, as evidenced by St. Luke’s, made it clear 
that post-merger efficiencies must be significant and not merely 
benefitting the merged entity with some trickle-down benefit to the 
consumer.264 More appropriately, the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning 
was in accord with healthcare policy, recognizing an efficiencies 
defense by the ability to attract better doctors and provide better 
care.265 The Supreme Court could resolve these inconsistencies and 
provide guidance to healthcare entities by developing a framework 
for the efficiencies defense that would establish whether or not the 
defense exists, and if it does, what exactly should be shown in order 
to succeed. 
The new analysis of healthcare mergers should give greater 
consideration to the efficiencies defense, specifically focusing on 
quality based efficiencies as well as cost based efficiencies. This 
shift in focus will help improve healthcare and bring antitrust law 
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into accord with healthcare policy by recognizing the shift in 
healthcare delivery to a prospective system, that focuses on 
improved patient outcomes and integrated care. 
In conclusion, a certain and predictable application of 
efficiencies defenses by courts, is necessary in order to move 
towards a prospective health care system with integrated care. As 
it is now, courts are divided on what is sufficient in establishing an 
efficiencies defense, leaving entities that seek to merge without 
guidance.266 The lack of certainty in healthcare mergers causes 
confusion and increases litigation. Reexamining the antitrust 
analysis of healthcare mergers in light of the ACA will improve all 
aspects of healthcare in America, including consumer welfare. In a 
world with a changing health care system, merging entities can 
improve patient outcomes through cost savings and integrated 
care, and therefore, should be allowed a less stringent efficiencies 
examination. 
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